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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE "CHOOSE-LIFE" SPECIALTY 
PLATE CASES: STANDING TO SUE WHEN THE GOVERNMENT 
MANIPULATES PUBLIC DEBATE 
INTRODUCTION 
In the Fall 1998 edition of the Radcliff Quarterly, journalist and 
attorney Wendy Kaminer announced that "[f]ree speech has been 
the latest casualty of the abortion wars, suffering attacks from left 
and right."! She described situations where activist groups pushed 
for laws or pursued claims that would effectively squash the speech 
activities of their opponents.2 In her view, these actions set a dan­
gerous precedent because they infringe upon "our right to conduct 
public debates about abortion (and other controversial matters), to 
engage in political advocacy, and to organize against whatever we 
regard as immoral or unjust."3 What Ms. Kaminer did not address, 
and possibly was not aware of, is that one of the biggest challenges 
to the First Amendment rights of abortion activists was just around 
the corner. 
In the same year that Ms. Kaminer wrote about the abortion 
war's encroachment on free speech rights, the Florida legislature 
passed its "choose-life" specialty license plate bil1.4 The bill pro­
vided for the manufacture, sale, and distribution of specialty license 
plate tags featuring the "choose-life" motto. It also set out a plan 
for the proceeds of the tags to be distributed to organizations that 
provide adoption services. Florida did not allow those funds to go 
to agencies "involved or associated with abortion activities" that of­
fer abortion or abortion as a choice.5 Subsequently, pro-life organi­
zations began to campaign for the implementation of "choose-life" 
1. Wendy Kaminer, Public Rights and Responsibilities: The Practical Importance 
of Free Speech, RADCLIFF QUARTERLY (Fall, 1998), available at www.radcliffe.eduJ 
quarterly /199803/page32.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2004). 
2. !d. 
3. Id. 
4. See FLA. STAT. ch. 320.08058, § 30 (2002). The "choose-life" specialty license 
plate bill was the creation of Randy Harris, the County Commissioner of Marion, Flor­
ida. The idea was to create a specialty license plate in which the proceeds would go 
toward the funding and education of women "in crisis pregnancies who would commit 
to having their babies and placing them for adoption rather than opting for abortion." 
Choose Life, Inc., About Us, at www.choose-life.orglstory.html (last visited Mar. 1, 
2004). 
5. See FLA. STAT. ch. 320.08058, § 30. 
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specialty plate programs around the United States.6 Responding to 
this legislative activity, both pro-choice organizations and individual 
pro-choice citizens brought various First Amendment challenges to 
these statutes.7 In these cases, the primary dilemma for the courts 
is the lack of consensus on whether these complaints should even 
be allowed through the courthouse gate; that is, whether the plain­
tiffs have standing to sue.8 This Note analyzes these "choose-life" 
specialty plate cases and focuses on one of the core legal issues re­
garding a party's standing to sue: whether individual citizens have 
standing to challenge the constitutionality of a legislature's issuance 
of a specialty plate which expresses the legislature's view on a hotly 
contested issue, the abortion rights debate, on the grounds that it 
constitutes viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.9 
6. Currently, "choose-life" specialty license plates are available in eight states: Ala­
bama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, Mississippi, and Oklahoma. 
In some states the specific legislation provides for a "choose-life" plate. This type of 
legislation is the focus of this note. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.§§ 27-15-3901-3908 
(2003), FLA. STAT.ch. 320.08058 (2002), MISS. CODE ANN.§ 27-19-56.70 (2003), OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 47, § 1136 (2003). In other states, "choose-life" plates are obtained via legisla­
tion that allows any non-profit group to obtain the production and sale of specialty 
plates via an existing statute or regulation if they meet pre-existing criteria. See, e.g., 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 249-9.3 (2003); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. I §§ 12-104(b), 13-619 
(2003). Two state legislatures passed specific "choose-life" specialty plate legislation 
that was found unconstitutional by the courts. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:463.61 (West 
1999), S.c. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8910 (Law. Co-op. 2002). In addition, many other states 
have specific "choose-life" specialty plate legislation in the pipeline. See, e.g., H.B. 630, 
147th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2003); H.B. 129, 125th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2003); H.B. 54, 
187th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003); H.B. 688, 103d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2003). 
7. Women's Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937, 945-46 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(affirming the holdings of two Southern District of Florida decisions, Women's Emer­
gency Network v. Dickinson, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (S.D. Fla. 2002) and Women's Emer­
gency Network v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (S.D. Fla. 2002), which held individuals 
and organizations lacked standing to bring challenge to Florida's "choose-life" specialty 
plate statute and that individual citizen's claims are not ripe for review because citizens 
have not applied for plate); Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. 
denied, 537 U.S. 1048 (2002), vacated and superceded by No. 00-31171,2003 WL 151183 
(5th Cir. 2003), on remand by 265 F. Supp. 2d 699 (E.D. La. 2003) (various plaintiffs 
challenge Louisiana's "choose-life" specialty plate statute and Fifth Circuit holds that 
they lack standing); Henderson v. Stalder, 265 F. Supp. 2d 699 (E.D. La. 2003) (dis­
missing challenge to Louisiana's "choose-life" specialty plate statute based on lack of 
standing); Planned Parenthood v. Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d 564 (D.S.C. 2002) (South Caro­
lina "choose-life" plate act declared impermissible viewpoint discrimination and held 
unconstitutional); Hildreth v. Dickinson, No. 99-583-CIV-J-21-A, 1999 WL 33603028 
(M.D. Fla. 1999) (granting alternate motion for summary judgment on theory that 
plaintiff's claim that Florida "choose-life" specialty plate statute violated First and 
Fourteenth Amendments on the grounds that standing did not exist). 
8. Id. 
9. The courts entertaining "choose-life" specialty plate lawsuits hold that plain­
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To accomplish its purpose, this Note discusses the Supreme 
Court's present articulation of the constitutional requirement of 
standing and its application to the "choose-life" standing cases. 
Thus, Part I of this Note provides a general commentary on the 
Supreme Court's current articulation of the standing doctrine and 
describes the constitutional requirements of standing as well as pru­
dential considerations. Additionally, Part I gives a general back­
ground of the overbreadth and prior restraint doctrines of First 
Amendment cases. Part II of the Note discusses the "choose-life" 
specialty plate statutes and the three cases of the "choose-life" li­
cense plate saga, Henderson v. Stalder10 (hereinafter Henderson I), 
Women's Emergency Network v. Bush ll (hereinafter Bush), and 
South Carolina Planned Parenthood Network v. Rose12 (hereinafter 
Rose). Part III builds on the foundation laid in the previous parts 
of the Note, paying particular attention to the two main theories 
expressed in the opinions that lend themselves to polar opposite 
holdings on the standing issue. Part IV provides an analysis of both 
these main theories. I assert that both analyses incorrectly charac­
terize the injury that individual pro-choice plaintiffs claim they suf­
fer as a result of "choose-life" specialty plate legislation and, thus, 
the theories constitute faulty standing analysis. Furthermore, I 
maintain that when standing is argued to exist in these cases, the 
tiffs lacked organizational and taxpayer standing based on additional Establishment 
Clause, Free Speech, and Fourteenth Amendment claims; however, these claims and 
decisions are not the focus of this Note. See Dickenson, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 1313-14 
(discussing taxpayer and organizational standing); Henderson, 287 F.3d at 379-82 (for a 
discussion on taxpayer and organizational standing in the case); Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 
566 (recognizing that plaintiffs launched individual as well as organizational challenges 
based on both the Fourteenth and First Amendments). See generally Jeremy T. Berry, 
Note, Licensing a Choice: "Choose Life" Specialty License Plates and their Constitu­
tional Implications, 51 EMORY L.J. 1605 (2002) (providing a brief commentary on those 
issues); Sarah E. Hurst, Note, A One Way Street to Unconstitutionality: The "Choose­
Life" Specialty License Plate, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 957 (2003) (for a discussion on the viabil­
ity of the Establishment Clause claims in the "choose-life" specialty plate cases). 
10. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 374. In the July 2003 remand the plaintiff applied for, 
and was denied, a "choose-choice" specialty plate as directed by the Fifth Circuit in 
January 2003. Henderson v. Stalder, 265 F. Supp. 2d 699 (E.D. La. Jul. 8, 2003). She 
filed a new complaint, this time challenging the entire specialty plate program, not just 
the "choose-life" specialty plate statute that was the issue of the Fifth Circuit's original 
holding. Id. Standing was granted and the entire specialty plate program was declared 
unconstitutional on these grounds. Id. This Note involves discussion of the original 
Fifth Circuit decision from 2002. See Henderson, 287 F.3d at 374. See also infra text 
accompanying notes 73-85 (providing an in-depth discussion of the Henderson 
chronology). 
11. Bush, 323 F.3d at 937. 
12. Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 564 
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"pro-standing" position inappropriately fashions standing by analo­
gizing these novel cases to cases that concern prior restraint injuries 
or injuries that result from punitive government actions. Finally, 
Part V goes on to demonstrate that the facts of these cases fit 
squarely within the requirements of what the Second Circuit has 
termed "Competitive Advocate Standing"13 in equal protection 
cases. Therefore, I urge federal courts to expand this model of 
standing to encompass free speech claims, such as the claims 
presented in the "choose-life" specialty plate cases, where a nar­
rowly defined law works to create a free speech benefit for a politi­
cal group that injures the ability of its political adversary to 
compete within a specific arena. 
I. THE STANDING DOGrRINE IN FREE SPEECH CASES 
At their most basic level, the "choose-life" specialty plate cases 
ask whether an individual plaintiff has made a claim worthy of be­
ing heard in a federal court. Not only is this question important 
because the answer provides finality about whether litigation will 
occur for the parties involved, but the answer also either narrows or 
broadens the range of cases that federal courts will entertain. Be­
cause the implications of the "choose-life" specialty plate cases14 
are far-reaching, it is important to layout the foundation of stand­
ing jurisprudence in the free speech context in order to appreciate 
fully the issues addressed in the cases. 
A. The Standing Doctrine Generally 
Article III of the United States Constitution circumscribes the 
authority of the federal judiciary by confining its power to include 
only the determination of actual "cases" and "controversies."15 
Federal courts have developed various doctrines under this Article 
13. See, e.g., Ctr. for Reprod. Law and Policy v. Bush, 304 F.3d 183, 197 (2nd Cir. 
2002) (holding that pro-choice plaintiffs have standing to challenge Standard Clause 
that prohibits "[foreign NGOs] from collaborating with Plaintiffs, [thereby] den[ying] 
Plaintiffs the opportunity to compete on an equal footing with opponents of abortion 
law reform."); In Re Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1028-29 (2nd Cir. 1989) 
("competitive advocate standing" is a kind of an injury "involve[ing] a determination 
that ... as a competitor a plaintiff ... personally competes in the same arena with the 
party to whom the government has bestowed the assertedly illegal benefit."); New Alli­
ance Party v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 858 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (crite­
ria for competitive advocate standing not met by plaintiff). 
14. See supra note 7 (listing the various cases involving challenges to "choose­
life" statutes). 
15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, d. 1. 
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III power, such as mootness, standing, ripeness, and political ques­
tion,16 to answer whether a "case or controversy" exists that entitles 
a plaintiff to federal court jurisdictionP The doctrine of standing is 
inferred from Article lIps to ensure that the federal judiciary does 
not render decisions that violate separation of powers principles19 
and to ensure the "exercise of [] power by a federal court" is not 
simply "gratuitous."2o The standing doctrine achieves these goals 
by enveloping both a constitutional requirement and prudential 
limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.21 Once raised, how­
ever, it becomes clear that standing is an "amorphous doctrine"22 
and the existing case law provides little direction for any new stand­
ing inquiry.23 
The Supreme Court currently utilizes the three-pronged test 
articulated in Lujan v. Defenders ofWildlife 24 to determine whether 
16. E.g., Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178-79 (C.A.D.C. 1984) (Bork, J., 
concurring), quoted with approval in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). 
All of the doctrines that cluster about Article III - not only standing but moot­
ness, ripeness, political question, and the like - relate in part, and in different 
though overlapping ways, to an idea, which is more than an intuition but less 
than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential 
limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of 
government. 
Id. 
17. E.g., Valley Forge Christian ColI. v. Am. United for the Separation of Church 
and State, 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). See also Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. V. Scheidler, 10 
U.S. 249, 255 (1994) (noting jurisdictional issues can be raised at any time for any rea­
son whatsoever). 
18. See, e.g., Lujan V. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992) (discuss­
ing that although Article III simply requires a plaintiff's complaint to be a "case" or 
"controversy," certain elements must form a determination of "case" or "controversy"). 
19. Allen, 468 U.S. at 752. 
20. Simon V. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) (stating that ab­
sent a showing that plaintiff has suffered an individualized injury "likely to be redressed 
by a favorable decision," standing "would be gratuitous" as opposed to consistent with 
Article III). 
21. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 750. 
22. Flast V. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (citing Hearings on S. 2097 Before the 
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 
2d Sess. 465, 467-68 (1966) (statement of Prof. Paul A. Freund)). 
23. Numerous law review articles are critical of standing. See generally William 
A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE. L.J. 221 (1988); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., 
Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen V. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1985) [here­
inafter Nichol I); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Anal­
ysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301 (2002) [hereinafter Nichol II); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is 
Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational 
Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 613 
(1999). 
24. Lujan V. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). In the seminal 
case in which the Supreme Court articulated the current standing requirement, environ­
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the constitutional requirement of standing has been met.25 This test 
asserts that at "its irreducible constitutional minimum"26 a party 
seeking jurisdiction in a federal court has the burden of showing: 1) 
some actual or threatened injury; 2) that can be traced to the chal­
lenged action of the defendant, and 3) that is likely to be redressed 
by a favorable decision.27 Thus, this test includes the three ele­
ments of injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability, each of which 
has its own independent criteria.28 Furthermore, Lujan makes 
clear that standing is "an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case"29 
and that at each stage of litigation the elements of standing must be 
supported the same way that the elements of any other matter in 
litigation would need to be supported.30 
The first requirement of standing, injury-in-fact, demands that 
a plaintiff must suffer "an invasion of a legally protected interest 
which is (a) concrete and particularized, (b) and actual or immi­
nent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.' "31 This means that al­
though an individual's claimed injury might be merely an 
"identifiable trifie,"32 a party seeking review must still be adversely 
affected or aggrieved by a defendant's actions.33 Moreover, so long 
mental groups brought an action against the Secretary of the Interior challenging a 
regulation that required other agencies to confer with the secretary under the Endan­
gered Species Act regarding federally funded projects in the United States or the high 
seas. Id. On certiorari, the Supreme Court, Scalia, J., held that the plaintiffs lacked 
standing on the basis that 1) the claimed injury was not sufficiently imminent and 2) and 
the injury was not redressable. ld. at 568-78. 
25. ld. at 560-61. 
26. ld. at 590 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (referring to the irreducible minimum 
requirements of standing). 
27. ld. at 560-61 (citations omitted). 
28. ld. 
29. ld. at 561. 
30. See id. (indicating that at the pleading stage general allegations of alleged 
injury suffice because on a motion to dismiss the court presumes that the general allega­
tions of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct are true and that on a motion for 
summary judgment specific facts must be set forth by plaintiff in order to show stand­
ing). See also Ny\care Health Plans, Inc. v. Aetna, 301 F.3d 329, 334-35 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(explaining that although the Supreme Court has not articulated the standard to be 
applied when a federal court raises the issue of standing sua sponte, it seems that the 
principles of fairness and notice to the parties should require that the standard be the 
same as when the plaintiff filed the claim). 
31. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 
(1990». 
32. U.S. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 
690 (1973). 
33. ld. at 690 n.14 (rejecting the argument that standing should be limited to 
when a person is "significantly affected" by an action of an agency, and reiterating that 
"'[i]njury in fact' reflects the statutory requirement that a person be 'adversely affected' 
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as the injury is particular to that individual the court cannot deny 
standing "simply because many people suffer the same injury."34 
Causation, the second requirement of standing, necessitates 
that the alleged injury is "fairly traceable" to the challenged action 
of the defendant and not the result of independent action of some 
third party not before the court.35 Scientific certainty that the de­
fendant's actions caused the precise harm suffered by the plaintiff is 
not needed to meet the causation element.36 Rather, the plaintiff 
must only establish that there exists a "substantial likelihood" that 
the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff's harm.37 
The final constitutional requirement of standing is redres­
sability. Redressability requires that it "is likely, as opposed to 
merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision."38 However, the case law is not clear as to what consti­
tutes "likely" as opposed to "speculative" redress.39 
Furthermore, Lujan makes clear that when the suit is a consti­
or 'aggrieved,' ... [thus,] it distinguish[es] a person with a direct stake in the outcome of 
a litigation - even though small- from a person with a mere interest in the problem."). 
See also Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 698 
F.2d 1098, 1102-03 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that in cases involving Establishment 
Clause claims, the motive for a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit may be partly spiritual or 
value-laden; however, to have standing and a day in court the plaiJ"ltiff must demon­
strate a particularized injury). 
34. See Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. at 686-88 
(asserting that standing cannot be denied to appellees because the claimed "harm to 
their use and enjoyment of the natural resources of the Washington area," was in fact a 
harm suffered by all those who use the resources). 
35. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-62 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 
426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976». 
36. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 
149, 161 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting fairly traceable requirement is not equivalent to that 
required in a tort claim); Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Termi­
nals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 72 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding plaintiffs do not need to show "to a 
scientific certainty that defendant's effluent, and defendant's effluent alone, caused the 
precise harm suffered by the plaintiffs"). But see Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 
F.3d 546, 558 (5th Cir. 1996) (utilizing a tort theory of contribution to determine "fairly 
traceable" prong of standing); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg., 
Inc., 2 F.3d 493, 505 (3d Cir. 1993) (articulating a standard for "fairly traceable" that 
imitates a tort theory of contribution). 
37. See, e.g., Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 913 F.2d at 72 (quoting Duke 
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 75 n.20 (1978». 
38. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. 
39. Compare id. at 571 (holding it was speculative whether redress would flow 
from a positive determination because court could not be certain that the claimed injury 
would stop if the government administrative agency conformed to the role it was re­
quired to take in statute), with Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(deciding standing is not defeated simply because an agency might take an adverse ac­
tion if finding for plaintiff requires agency to take an action). 
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tutional challenge to the legality of government action or inaction 
"the nature and extent of facts that must be averred . . . or 
proved ... in order to establish standing depends considerably upon 
whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action or forgone 
action at issue."4o If the plaintiff is the object of the action, courts 
are usually quick to hold that the action or inaction has caused the 
plaintiff's alleged injury and "that a judgment preventing or requir­
ing the action will redress it."41 Conversely, although the plaintiff's 
claim is not precluded when he or she is not the object of the gov­
ernment action or inaction challenged, standing in these cases is 
"substantially more difficult to establish."42 
In addition to the constitutional requirements of standing ad­
dressed above, federal courts also consider prudential interests.43 
Prudential considerations federal courts take into account when 
making standing determinations include the general prohibition 
against one litigant raising another person's legal rights,44 the rule 
barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately 
addressed in the representative branches,45 and the requirement 
40. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. 
41. Id. at 561-62. 
42. Id. at 562. Lujan articulated that when a plaintiffs asserted injury arises from 
the government's allegedly unlawful regulation or lack of regulation of someone else 
(such as an agency), causation and redress ability usually turn on the response of the 
regulated or regulable third party to the government action or inaction. Id. It becomes 
the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts showing that those choices have been or will 
be made in such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury. Id. 
However, Lujan did not address what causation and redressablility would turn on in a 
case where the plaintiff's asserted injury arose from the government's grant of a benefit 
to someone else - the situation confronted in the "choose-life" specialty plate cases. 
43. John C. Reitz, Standing to Raise Constitutional Issues, 50 AM. J. COMPo L. 437, 
439-43 (2002) (discussing the sources of the standing rules, including prudential consid­
erations). Reitz's article discusses the sources of the standing doctrine, including the 
history of prudential considerations. He states, "for most of its history, the Court has 
emphasized primarily 'prudential' bases for standing - that is, the Court has claimed 
that the standing limitations result chiefly from the Court's own voluntary policy of self­
restraint for various reasons. Only in the last three decades has the separation of pow­
ers argument emerged as the chief foundation of the standing rules." Id. at 442 (cita­
tion omitted). 
44. Valley Forge Christian ColI. V. Am. United for the Separation of Church and 
State, 453 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982). See also Singleton V. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-14 
(1976) (stating that the reason for the prohibition on third party standing includes the 
fact that courts should not adjudicate third party rights unnecessarily or "it may be that 
in fact that the holders of those rights either do not wish to assert them, or will be able 
to enjoy them regardless of whether the in-court litigant is successful or not"). 
45. Valley Forge Christian Coli., 453 U.S. at 474. See also Ryan Guilds, A Juris­
prudence of Doubt: Generalized Grievances as a Limitation to Federal Court Access, 74 
N.C. L. REV. 1863, 1888 (1986). Although Guilds points out that courts are uncertain 
whether to treat the standing prohibition against generalized grievances as a constitu­
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that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the "zone of interests" pro­
tected by the law invoked.46 However, because prudential consid­
erations are not a required part of standing, federal courts have 
much more flexibility in their application.47 Thus, in the interest of 
justice, courts will often relax these requirements.48 
B. 	 The Role of Overbreadth and Prior Restraint in Standing 
Cases 
In free speech cases, the doctrine of overbreadth was devel­
oped to aid litigants in establishing standing in instances when an 
overly broad law threatens to deny the litigant free speech protec­
tions secured by the First Amendment.49 However, considerable 
debate exists over when exactly the doctrine of overbreadth applies 
in a particular case. Some federal courts treat it as a relaxation of 
the ordinary standing elements. 50 Other federal courts treat over­
breadth as a relaxation of only the injury-in-fact element of stand­
tional or prudential consideration, they are clear that the prohibition involves consider­
ations about separation of powers principles and the prohibition against the court 
giving advisory opinions. Id. 
46. 	 Valley Forge Christian Coil., 453 U.S. at 475. 
47. 	 Id. at 471-72. See also Reitz, supra note 43, at 442. 
All U.S.-American doctrines of justiciability are permeated by a strong sense 
that the courts must exercise self-restraint in exercising their powers of judicial 
review in order to temper inevitable conflicts with the other branches of gov­
ernment. No doubt this attitude springs at least in major part from the fact 
that the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly provide for judicial review and 
the courts have therefore thought it important to defend their claim of that 
power by trying to avoid overplaying their hand. Because the prudential tests 
for standing are not required by the Constitution, they have not been applied 
with much rigor. They are often not mentioned in the Court's opinions on 
standing. Moreover, they overlap to some extent with the constitutional re­
quirements. For example, strict application of the personal injury test should 
rule out most generalized grievances, but as the Court has been willing to rec­
ognize intangible harms, some of which are widely shared, it has had to aban­
don the policy against general grievances in many cases. In order to facilitate 
judicial review at the behest of private litigants, the Court has recognized 
many third-party claims in violation of the prudential policy against them. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
48. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193 (1976) (noting that "our decisions 
have settled that limitations on a litigant's assertion of jus tertii ... stem from a salutary 
'rule of self-restraint ... "'); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445 (1972) (relaxing the 
ability of a third party to bring constitutional challenge). 
49. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (discussing the reasons for over­
breadth doctrine). A facial challenge to a statute exists not only where an overly broad 
statute reaches into areas of protected expression, but also where a statute is unconsti­
tutional in every conceivable application. See, e.g., Members of City Council v. Taxpay­
ers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796 (1984). 
50. 	 Vincent, 466 U.S. at 796-98. See also Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1122 n.5 
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ing.51 Still other courts treat overbreadth as an additional 
prudential concern that a federal court may choose to apply.52 De­
spite this debate, what is clear is that overbreadth is "a judicially 
created doctrine designed to prevent the chilling of protected ex­
pression."53 In other words, the doctrine of overbreadth reasons 
that an unconstitutional restriction on expression might stop parties 
not before the court from engaging in protected speech and, there­
fore, those parties would be effectively deni~d judicial review.54 
Constitutional scholar Richard H. Fallon has distilled the situa­
tions in which the Supreme Court allows facial challenges on the 
grounds of overbreadth.55 First, courts allow overbreadth chal­
lenges when the government has placed an obstacle or "roadblock" 
in the way of expressive activity or speech in order to control what 
it believes is a compelling interest.56 Second, it applies when a state 
regulates speech or expressive activity based on the belief that the 
category is not constitutionally protected.57 Third, overbreadth ap­
plies when the statute's true goal is to promote state interests unre­
lated to the content of speech or expressive activity, but the statute 
incidentally affects speech rights. 58 Finally, it applies where a stat­
(11th Cir. 1994) (noting that the overbreadth doctrine was a relaxation of standing 
requirements). 
51. Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1988). See also Z.J. 
Gifts D-4, L.L.c. v. City of Littleton, 311 F.3d 1220, 1227 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
application of overbreadth principles "does not eliminate the need for the plaintiff to 
demonstrate its own cognizable injury in fact"). 
52. Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 581 (1989); Stanley v. Jones, 239 F.3d 
769, 779 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that rule allowing facial challenges is a prudential doc­
trine rather than a constitutional right). 
53. Oakes, 491 U.S. at 584 (stating, "[o]verbreadth is a judicially created doctrine 
designed to prevent the chilling of protected expression. An overbroad statute is not 
void ab initio, but rather voidable, subject to invalidation notwithstanding the defen­
dant's unprotected conduct out of solicitude to the First Amendment rights of parties 
not before the court"). 
54. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 
n.8 (1980). 
55. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 863 
(1991) (explaining the four situations where overbreadth challenges appear in free 
speech cases). 
56. [d. at 866. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n V. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 
U.S. 238, 263 (1986) (recognizing the state's interests in trying to level the playing field 
of speech by disallowing direct expenditure of corporate funds for elections, holding 
that the Massachusetts' act creating prohibition muzzled free speech as applied). 
57. Fallon, supra note 55, at 866. See, e.g., Keyishian V. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 
589, 603-04 (1967) (holding unconstitutional overly broad New York statutes and ad­
ministrative regulations that placed criminal penalties on students and school employ­
ees because the penalties where "subversive"). 
58. Fallon, supra note 55, at 866. See, e.g., Marsh V. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501,509­
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ute "fails to provide adequate safeguards against administrative im­
position of constitutionally impermissible restraints."59 
Another rule that applies to free speech standing issues is the 
doctrine of prior restraint established in Near v. Minnesota.60 Prin­
cipally, prior restraints are "administrative and judicial orders for­
bidding certain communications when issued in advance of such 
time as communications are to occur."61 The prior restraint doc­
trine is a prohibition that places a high presumption of invalidity on 
those things that constitute a prior restraint.62 It is derived from the 
First Amendment63 which states that "Congress shall make no 
law ... abridging the freedom of speech."64 
A prior restraint violation is not a trivial mistake. In Nebraska 
Press Association v. Stuart,65 Justice Burger wrote, "prior restraints 
on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolera­
ble infringement on First Amendment rights. Prior restraint ... has 
an immediate and irreversible sanction."66 The federal courts have 
recognized two different forms of prior restraints: 1) judicial injunc­
tions prohibiting speech,67 and 2) burdens placed on communica­
tion before the communication is made.68 In the case of judicial 
injunctions that prohibit protected speech, the court has held 
"[ s ]ubsequent civil or criminal proceedings, rather than prior re­
10 (1946) (determining unconstitutional Alabama statute aiming to protect property 
rights of owners by making it a crime to enter or remain on premises after being told 
not to because free speech interests have preferred statutes). 
59. Fallon, supra note 55, at 866. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealers 
Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757-69 (1988) (holding unconstitutional ordinance granting 
mayor the authority to grant or deny permit to place news rack on private property 
because it has danger of "chilling" constitutionally protected speech). 
60. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
61. Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993). 
62. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 555 (2001) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(quoting New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971)) (re-affirming that 
"prior restraints on speech bear 'a heavy presumption against ... constitutionality.' "); 
CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1318 (1994). 
63. Additionally, the Court has held that the First Amendment applies to the 
states as well as the federal government through the Due Process clause of the Four­
teenth Amendment. E.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940). 
64. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
65. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). 
66. Id. 
67. Lawson v. Murray, 515 U.S. 1110, 1113 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
68. Generally, this will mean that a permit system or licensing requirement is 
valid only if the discretion of the licensing official is limited to questions of times, place, 
and manner, i.e. the discretion is content-neutral. See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 
U.S. 569, 574-76 (1941). See also Kevin Francis O'Neill, A First Amendment Compass: 
Navigating the Speech Clause with a Five-Step Analytical Framework, 29 Sw. U. L. REV. 
223,270-78 (2000) (for a general discussion on the two forms of prior restraint). 
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straints [i.e. the injunction or gag order], ordinarily are the appro­
priate sanction for ... misdeeds in the First Amendment context."69 
The doctrines of overbreadth and prior restraint are often used 
together when determining standing in the free speech contextJ° 
Specifically, courts consider overly broad laws that grant "unfet­
tered discretion" in a licensing official to grant or deny licenses to 
be prior restraints on speech because they "chill" the ability of a 
particular speaker to speak before speech is to occur.71 One could 
say that in the First Amendment context the injury of the overly 
broad statute or law is the prior restraint on speech. 
II. THE "CHOOSE-LIFE" SPECIALTY PLATE 

STATUTES AND CASES 

The "choose-life" specialty plate legislation enacted through­
out the United States is strikingly similar. The basic premise be­
hind "choose-life" specialty plates legislation is threefold: 1) the 
statutes allow those individual car owners desiring to disseminate 
the "choose-life" message the ability to do so via the purchase and 
display of a "choose-life" specialty plate, 2) the statutes guarantee 
that the revenue generated from the sale of the specialty plates will 
go solely toward the funding of adoption services for women in 
"crisis pregnancies," and 3) the statutes specifically prohibit any 
generated revenue from going to agencies that offer counseling on 
abortion as a choice or abortion services.72 Before launching into 
an analysis of the positions on standing contained in the "choose­
life" specialty plate cases, this part focuses attention on the underly­
ing statutes at issue and the substance of the opinions in the cases 
that concern them. Thus, this section lays out the context necessary 
to apply the aforementioned standing principles to the "choose­
life" specialty plate cases. 
69. CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1318 (1994). 
70. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973) (discussing that over­
breadth challenges are entertained when there is a prior restraint violation). 
71. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757-59 (1988). 
72. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 320.08058, § 30 (2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 47:463.61 (West 1999); S.c. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8910 (Law. Co-op. 2002). Hawaii is an 
example of a state that has issued "choose-life" specialty plates through legislation that 
is not specifically aimed at creating a "choose-life" plate. Under the Hawaii scheme, 
any non-profit organization can apply for a specialty plate if they meet certain criteria. 
The directors of finance for the counties in Hawaii approve or deny specialty plates in 
accord with that statute. Therefore, although the scheme in Hawaii and states with 
similar provisions might raise speech issues, it does not raise the standing issues that are 
the subject of this note. HAW. REV. STAT. § 249-9.3 (2003). 
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A. The Louisiana Scheme 
Before the Fifth Circuit declared the entire specialty plate 
scheme of Louisiana unconstitutional in the summer of 2003,73 Lou­
isiana had a practice that the issuance of any specialty license plate 
needed to be secured by an act of the legislature.74 One specialty 
plate statute under this scheme was the Louisiana "choose-life" 
specialty plate statute that required all revenue generated from the 
sale of the "choose-life" specialty plates go to a fund authorized to 
distribute grants to organizations meeting the statute's criteria.75 
The statute also created a "Choose-Life Advisory Council" to de­
sign the license plates and make decisions about what organizations 
will receive grants.76 The statute required the council's member­
ship be composed of members from known pro-life organizations, 
including the American Family Association, the Louisiana Family 
Forum, and Concerned Women for America.77 
Plaintiffs, including individual Louisiana taxpayers and 
Planned Parenthood, brought a suit in August of 2000 challenging 
the constitutionality of the Louisiana statute.78 This case was the 
first of the three "choose-life" specialty plate cases, and although 
the case was ultimately vacated with instructions that the plaintiffs 
amend their complaint in order to have the substantive claim de­
cided by the Eastern District of Louisiana,79 the reasoning of the 
Fifth Circuit's original standing decision articulates the positions for 
and against individual standing when a plaintiff alleges he or she is 
injured by a particular speech benefit granted to another group.80 
The plaintiffs alleged that the statute "abrogate[d] their right to 
free speech, constitute[ d] an impermissible establishment of relig­
73. Henderson v. Stalder, 265 F. Supp. 2d 699 (E.D. La. 2003) 
74. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:463.7-47:463.110 (West 1999). 
75. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:463.61(F)(2) (West 1999). 
76. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:463.61(E) (West 1999). 
77. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:463.61(E)(a-c) (West 1999). See also Henderson v. 
Stalder, 287 F.3d 374, 377-78 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1048 (2002), vacated 
and superceded by No. 00-31171, 2003 WL 151183 (5th Cir. 2003), on remand by 265 F. 
Supp. 2d 699 (E.D. La. 2003). The web sites for these organizations also make clear 
their pro-life position. See generally American Family Association Online, at www. 
afa.net/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2004); Concerned Women for America Website, at www. 
cwfa.orgllibrary.asp?category=life (last visited Mar. 1, 2004); Louisiana Family Forum 
Website, at www.lafamilyforum.org! (last visited Mar. 1, 2004). 
78. Henderson v. Stalder, 112 F. Supp. 2d 589, 595 (E.D. La. 2000), rev'd, 287 
F.3d. 374 (5th Cir. 2002). 
79. Henderson, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 699 (E.D. La. 2003). See supra note 7 and 
accompanying text. 
80. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 374. 
182 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:169 
ion, and denie[ d] them their right to due process in violation of the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitu­
tion."81 The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the stat­
ute is unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement.82 
In its original decision on appeal, the Fifth Circuit rejected all the 
plaintiffs' arguments, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing on 
all grounds averred to challenge the "choose-life" specialty plates.83 
In particular, the majority held that the individual plaintiff, Keeler, 
lacked standing to challenge the statute based on grounds that the 
statute constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination on the 
part of the legislature, because even if the court declared the statute 
unconstitutional there would be no redress for her injury.84 In con­
trast, the dissent argued that plaintiff Keeler had standing to chal­
lenge the specialty plate statute because redress would come in the 
form of "creat[ing] a level playing field for all affected by the 
statute."85 
B. The Florida Scheme 
In Florida, the legislature enacted the "choose-life" specialty 
plate legislation pursuant to a Florida law that allows organizations 
desiring a specialty license plate to request a plate after meeting 
certain preliminary criteria.86 The legislature can either grant or 
deny the request.87 Although the goals of the Florida "choose-life" 
specialty plate statute are almost identical to the Louisiana goals,88 
the Florida statute has a different scheme for the distribution of the 
funds, though the intended beneficiaries are still non-profit pro-life 
adoption organizations.89 Under Florida's scheme, fees generated 
from the sale of the specialty license plates are distributed to each 
county "in the ration that the annual use fees collected by each 
county bears to the total fees collected for the plates within the 
state."90 To date, it has been reported that because of this program 
81. Id. at 377. See also Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 591. 
82. Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 592. 
83. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 379-81 (stating that both the individual and the state 
plaintiffs lacked standing). 
84. Id. at 387. 
85. Id. at 392 (Davis, J., dissenting). 
86. FLA. STAT. ch. 320.08053 (2002). 
87. Id. 
88. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77. 
89. FLA. STAT. ch. 320.08058 (2002). 
90. Id. Although not central to this Note's discussion of standing, Florida's 
scheme attempts a more democratic distribution than other "choose-life" specialty plate 
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over two million dollars has been generated for Florida pro-life, 
non-profit crisis-pregnancy organizations.91 
In Bush92 , the Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument 
presented by individual plaintiffs Becker and Jackson that the State 
of Florida violated their First Amendment rights "by providing a 
public forum for pro-life car owners to express their political views 
but not providing a similar forum for pro-choice car owners. "93 In 
keeping with the Henderson I decision, the Eleventh Circuit re­
jected the plaintiffs' complaint on redress ability grounds.94 The 
Bush court also rejected the individual plaintiffs' arguments for 
lack of a cognizable injury-in-fact.95 In the Eleventh Circuit's view, 
the plaintiffs did not claim an injury, and an injunction against the 
enforcement of the Florida "choose-life" specialty plate statute 
would not "in any way advance Appellant's opportunity to 
speak."96 
C. The South Carolina Scheme 
In South Carolina, the "choose-life" specialty plate act requires 
the South Carolina Department of Public Safety to issue the spe­
cialty plate to any person requesting the plate.97 As in Louisiana 
and Florida, proceeds from the funds are to be distributed to local 
pro-life, non-profit agencies that provide "crisis pregnancy" pro-
statutes. The Florida scheme arguably strengthens the position that the speech is not 
state speech. Unlike the statutes in Louisiana and South Carolina, the Florida scheme 
at least makes certain that the county where the purchaser buys the plate will receive 
that purchaser's proceeds. 
91. Choose Life, Inc. Website, at http://www.choose-life.org!story.html(last vis­
ited Mar. 1, 2004). Choose Life, Inc. describes the funds raised in Florida as follows: 
"As of September 2003, over $2,000,000.00 has been raised and the tags continue to sell, 
raising over $70,000.00 per month." [d. 
92. Women's Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937 (11th Cir. 2003). In an­
other Florida case challenging the Florida statute the District Court for the Middle 
District of Florida granted Defendant's alternate motion for summary judgment which 
dismissed plaintiff's claim that Florida "choose-life" specialty plate statute violated free 
speech for lack of standing. Hildreth v. Dickinson, No. 99-583-CIV-J-21-A, 1999 WL 
33603028 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1999). This Note does not analyze this case as the Elev­
enth Circuit provided the more exhaustive analysis of the same issue in Florida. 
93. Bush, 323 F.3d at 942. 
94. /d. at 947. 
95. [d. at 946-47. In rejecting the notion that the plaintiff articulated an injury in 
fact, the Eleventh Circuit held that "the state of Florida has not denied Appellants' 
access to the specialty license plate forum ... [nor] rejected Appellants' application for 
a specialty license plate." [d. 
96. [d. 
97. S.c. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8910 (Law. Co-op. 2002). 
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grams.98 However, unlike the Florida and Louisiana statutes, the 
South Carolina "choose-life" specialty plate statute is separate from 
the statute authorizing other specialty plates.99 Under South Caro­
lina's pre-existing general specialty license plate statute, non-profit 
organizations apply for license plates promoting their group and the 
group's license plates are only available to members of the "certi­
fied" organization.1°O The South Carolina "choose-life" specialty 
plate program, however, was created and approved by an act of the 
legislature, thereby avoiding the earlier system designed to allow 
non-profit organizations to obtain permission for access to the li­
cense plate forum through a legislatively authorized process.101 
In Rose, the district court was asked to determine whether the 
South Carolina legislature violated the Constitution when it en­
acted South Carolina's "choose-life" specialty plate statute.102 On 
cross motion for summary judgment,103 the Rose court rejected the 
arguments posited by the defendant that the plaintiffs lacked stand­
ing to bring the free speech claim against them. More specifically, 
the Rose court affirmatively adopted Judge Davis' argument for 
standing presented in Henderson 1,104 holding that in a case where 
the legislative process "uncontrolled by any standards . . . al­
leged[ly] selects one viewpoint over all others on a particular 
topic"105 that the plaintiff may bring a facial challenge to the offen­
sive statute without meeting the traditional standing require­
ments.106 
III. THE Two CENTRAL POSITIONS ON THE STANDING ISSUE 
The three cases introduced above articulate the current theo­
ries of standing where an individual citizen claims viewpoint dis­
crimination by the government when it grants access to a speech 
98. Id. 
99. See Planned Parenthood v. Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d 564, 564-66 (D.S.C. 2002) 
(analyzing how the South Carolina scheme operates). 
100. S.c. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8000(D) (Law. Co-op. 2002). 
101. S.c. CODE ANN. § 6-3-8910 (Law. Co-op. 2002). See also Rose, 236 F. Supp. 
2d at 566. 
102. Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 574 (declaring South Carolina "choose-life" plate 
act impermissible viewpoint discrimination and therefore unconstitutional). 
103. !d. at 565. 
104. Id. at 568; Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374, 387 (5th Cir. 2002) (Davis, J., 
dissenting), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1048 (2002), vacated and superceded by No. 00-31171, 
2003 WL 151183 (5th Cir. 2003), on remand by 265 F. Supp. 2d 699 (E.D. La. 2003). 
105. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 387 (Davis, J., dissenting). 
106. Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 568-69. 
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forum to individuals whose speech the plaintiff does not like or 
agree with. This part distills the two central arguments. 
A. The Pro-Standing Side of the Debate 
In his dissenting opinion in Henderson I, Judge Davis articu­
lated a pro-standing position regarding individual First Amendment 
standing in the "choose-life" specialty cases that was later utilized, 
in part, by the Rose court.107 According to Judge Davis' rationale, 
the injury that plaintiff Keeler complained of in Henderson I is that 
the "choose-life" specialty plate statute passed by the legislature 
"allows for expression of the choose life message on state prestige 
license plates, without allowing for the expression of the opposing 
pro-choice viewpoint in the same forum. "108 Judge Davis articu­
lates that it is evident from the facts of Henderson I that the Louisi­
ana legislature will not pass a statute authorizing a specialty plate 
with the pro-choice view.109 He opines that the Equal Protection 
Clause and the First Amendment afford individuals the security 
that the government may not grant the use of a forum to people 
whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to 
express less favorable or more controversial views.1 l0 He empha­
sizes, "[t]here is 'equality in the field of ideas,' and government 
must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard."l11 
According to Judge Davis, individual plaintiff Keeler's claim in 
Henderson I is one that involves a free speech issue and, therefore, 
the court should apply an "expanded notion of standing."112 Rely­
ing on City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing CO.,113 Judge 
107. Id. at 568; Henderson, 287 F.3d at 387 (Davis, J., dissenting). 
108. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 387 (5th Cir. 2002) (Davis, J., dissenting). 
109. Id. at 387 n.l (Davis, J., dissenting). 
110. Id. at 387 (Davis, J., dissenting) (citing as authority Police Dep't v. Mosley, 
408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972». 
111. Id.(Davis, J., dissenting) (quoting Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96. 
112. /d. at 388 (Davis, J., dissenting). See also Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 568-70 
(discussing how it agrees that an expanded notion of standing applies in this type of 
case and also viewing the cases cited by Judge Davis as dispositive). 
113. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988). Plain 
Dealer Publishing challenged a Lakewood city ordinance that authorized the mayor to 
grant or deny the applications of publishers who sought permission to place newspaper 
racks on public property. Id. The ordinance required Lakewood's mayor to give an 
explanation if he denied a permit, but, by the terms of the ordinance he could operate 
within whatever "terms and conditions" he "deemed necessary and reasonable." Id. at 
754. The Supreme Court held that the Lakewood ordinance was facially invalid be­
cause the mayor had "unfettered" discretion to discriminate in granting permits based 
on the content of a publisher's publications or the viewpoints of those publications. Id. 
at 764. Moreover, the Court held that this kind of discretion encouraged publishers to 
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Davis reasons that a facial challenge to a licensing law should be 
brought whenever a party is subject to a law that "vests unbridled 
discretion" in a governmental official or agency to permit or deny a 
license based on content or viewpoint and "the law has a close 
nexus to expression."114 He states that although in most instances 
the discretionary power to grant or deny a license is given to a gov­
ernment actor under the statute, he sees "no reason why the princi­
ple should not be applied [to the facts of Henderson 1]."115 The fact 
that the legislature makes the decision to grant or deny a license is 
not distinguishable from the current case law that allows facial chal­
lenges where the discretionary agent is one that was granted its 
power from the legislature.116 
Furthermore, Judge Davis reasons that it is irrelevant whether 
a specific statute creates Louisiana's specialty license plate pro­
gram.117 He cites Neimotko v. Maryland 118 in support of his argu­
ment that an unfair policy and practice can emerge where 
"unfettered discretion" is the standard for granting a license in vio­
lation of the Constitution.119 
Judge Davis further argues that under traditional analysis 
Keeler would have standing because the majority was mistaken in 
its framing of her injury and in its conclusion that her claim does 
not request a redressable remedyPO Comparing Orr v. Orr121 and 
censor their publications or to "play nice" with the mayor in order to obtain approval of 
their licensing requests. Id. The Court opined that cities can require licensing of news 
racks on public property and reasonable restrictions on that license. !d. However, it 
made clear that cities cannot make obtaining a license subject to the unchecked discre­
tion of one public official. Id. 
114. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 388 (Davis, J., dissenting) (citing Lakewood, 486 
U.S. at 755-56). 
115. Id. (Davis, J., dissenting). 
116. Id. at 389 (Davis, J., dissenting) (citing Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 
U.S. 147 (1969». 
117. Id. at 389 (Davis, J., dissenting). 
118. Neimotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). A group's application to a city 
council for permits to use a city park for Bible talks was denied, for no apparent reason 
except the city council's disdain or disagreement with the group's opinions. Id. at 272. 
Subsequently, the group members were convicted on charges of disorderly conduct for 
having public speeches and meetings without a permit. Id. at 270. There was no evi­
dence of disorder, violence, threat of violence or riot. Id. at 271. Also, there was no 
official ordinance that regulated the park's use, just a practice that developed whereby 
permits had to be obtained by the park commissioner and city council. Id. at 269. The 
Supreme Court allowed the facial challenge to go forward. Id. at 273. 
119. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 389 (Davis, J., dissenting). 
120. Id. at 390 (Davis, J., dissenting). Although the Rose court clearly agrees 
with Judge Davis' dissent that an expanded notion of standing allows for a facial chal­
lenge to the "choose-life" plate statute, the district court in Rose also favorably cited 
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Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland122 to the facts in Hender­
son I, Judge Davis concludes that when a law grants a privilege re­
lated to speech to a select group it is really just "manipulating the 
playing field for speech" and placing "a burden on the free speech 
rights of [the plaintiff]. "123 When this happens, removal of the dis­
criminatory program redresses the injury because it simply "creates 
a level playing field."124 This is consistent with Orr and Ragland, 
he maintains, because in those cases redress came in the form of 
removing the unconstitutional benefit from the beneficiary rather 
than granting the unconstitutionally denied benefit to the 
plaintiff.125 
Moreover, Judge Davis states that the "choose-life" statute is 
like the sales tax exemption in Ragland that grants a speech privi­
lege to a select group of individuals.126 He claims that in Henderson 
and referenced Judge Davis' analysis of standing if the "traditional elements" of stand­
ing are applied and the redressability prong is at issue. Planned Parenthood v. Rose, 
236 F. Supp. 2d 564, 568 (D.S.C. 2002). 
121. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268-272 (1979). In Orr, an Alabama statute granted a 
benefit to wives or recently divorced women by excluding them from having to pay 
alimony to their husbands or ex-husbands. ld. at 270. One ex-husband challenged the 
statute on equal protection grounds. ld. at 271. The Supreme Court declared the stat­
ute unconstitutional reasoning that the statute was not substantially related to the goal 
of helping needy spouses or reducing the historical disparity between women and men 
that is caused by discrimination against women. ld. at 282-83. 
122. 481 U.S. 221 (1987). Arkansas imposed a tax on receipts from the sale of 
tangible personal property, but exempted, among other things, newspapers and "relig­
ious, professional, trade, and sports journals and/or publications printed and published 
within this State." ld. at 224. A publisher of a general interest magazine that included 
articles on subjects, including religion and sports, brought suit arguing that the tax ex­
emption violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. ld. at 225. The publishers 
sought a refund of the sales taxes it had paid since 1982. ld. The major force of the 
publisher's argument was that subjecting its magazine to the sales tax, while sales of 
newspapers and other magazines were exempt, imposed a free speech penalty on the 
publisher. ld. at 226. The Supreme Court held that the publisher had standing to chal­
lenge the Arkansas sales tax scheme. ld. Moreover, the Court rejected the argument 
that the publisher did not assert a redressable injury because the publisher did not pub­
lish a newspaper or a religious, professional, trade, or sports journal. [d. at 227. In the 
Court's view, underinclusive statutes would be isolated from constitutional challenge if 
the plaintiffs challenge were denied. ld. at 233. See also Henderson, 287 F.3d at 391 
(Davis, J., dissenting). According to Judge Davis, the state in Ragland argued that de­
claring the statute invalid would afford the appellant no relief because it would deny the 
exemption to those the statute was designed to benefit; it would not remove the offen­
sive tax on the appellant. ld. The Supreme Court, he points out, rejected that reason­
ing in Ragland because "such a proposition would effectively insulate under inclusive 
statutes from constitutional challenge." ld. 
123. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 391 (Davis, J., dissenting). 
124. ld. at 392. 
125. ld. at 391. 
126. ld. 
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I, as in Orr and Ragland, it is "immaterial" whether the individual 
plaintiff would derive a benefit if her claim were successful because 
"this constitutional attack holds the only promise of escape from 
the burden on her free speech rights that derive from the chal­
lenged statute."127 
B. The No-Standing Side of the Debate 
The no-standing position in the debate was first articulated in 
Henderson I and later solidified in the Bush decision.128 There are 
two basic theories to this contention that are addressed in turn. The 
first position is that individual plaintiffs lack standing to sue be­
cause the injury complained of-the inability to express one's pro­
choice view within a state created license plate forum-could not 
be redressed by a remedy that sought to declare the statute uncon­
stitutional.129 According to this view, declaring the statute uncon­
stitutional cannot redress the injury because it does not grant access 
to the speech forum and only prohibits the speech of others.130 The 
other position involves the injury-in-fact prong of standing.B I Ac­
cording to this theory, the plaintiffs have not alleged an injury-in­
fact because they have not applied for and subsequently been de­
nied a specialty plate.132 Because of this, the position holds, the 
state cannot be alleged to have denied plaintiffs a speech benefit.133 
In her concurring opinion in Henderson I, Judge Jones man­
ages to provide the most exhaustive articulation of the "no-stand­
ing" position on redressibility. In that opinion, she reiterates the 
Supreme Court's current enunciation of the elements used to deter­
mine standing: that at its "irreducible minimum" standing requires 
a plaintiff to show that he or she has "suffered an injury in fact," 
that "the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's actions," and 
the injury "will likely be redressed by a favorable decision."134 In 
response to the plaintiff's challenge in Henderson I that sought a 
preliminary injunction, she states in language later adopted by the 
Eleventh Circuit that "even if the Choose-Life statute is declared 
127. Id. at 392. 
128. Women's Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937 (11th Cir. 2003). 
129. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 381; Bush, 323 F.3d at 947. 
130. Bush, 323 F.3d at 947. 
131. Id. at 946-47. 
132. Id. at 947. 
133. Id. 
134. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 378 (Jones, J., concurring) (quoting Pub. Citizen, Inc. 
v. Bomer, 274 F.3d 212, 217 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992))). 
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unconstitutional, [the plaintiff's] complained of injury would not be 
redressed as that remedy will not provide [plaintiff] a forum in 
which to express her pro-choice view."135 In other words, Judge 
Jones claims that free speech jurisprudence traditionally holds the 
remedy for a speaker's unjust exclusion from a forum is to admit 
the speaker.136 She opines that an injunction that would require the 
removal of pro-life speakers runs contrary to the law of free speech 
because it censors those speakers and does nothing to provide a 
forum for the plaintiff who has complained of an injury-in-fact in 
the form of viewpoint discrimination by government officials.137 
Judge Jones' concurring opinion, however, does more than 
state her position's rationale for why standing does not exist in the 
"choose-life" specialty plate context. She uses her platform to scru­
tinize directly Judge Davis' dissent in Henderson I, and, by implica­
tion, the position later articulated in Rose.138 For example, she 
Orr139questions the use of Orr v. and Arkansas Writers' Project, 
Inc. v. Ragland140 as precedent for the pro-standing position. She 
maintains that although these two cases involve parties that claimed 
injuries resulting from the grant of a statutory benefit to others, 
they are distinguishable because declaring the statute unconstitu­
tional in both these cases only presented the "possibility" that the 
plaintiff'S injuries might not be redressed,141 However, she argues 
that the relief requested by the plaintiff would have "no possibility 
whatsoever" of redressing the complained of injury because the 
speech forum would be nixed.142 
Furthermore, she argues that the plaintiff's claim does not 
135. Id. at 381. See also Bush, 323 F.3d 937 at 947 (holding that "[r]emoving pro­
life speech from the forum does not in any way advance Appellants' opportunity to 
speak."). 
136. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 387 (Jones, J., concurring). 
137. Id. See also Bush, 323 F.3d at 947. Although the Eleventh Circuit does not 
maintain that the alleged injury-in-fact is cognizable, it clearly adopted the same ratio­
nale as Judge Jones on the redressibility issue when it held that redress is not possible 
because the requested injunction would only remove pro-life speech and do nothing to 
advance the allegedly injured speech, and that redress is problematic because the First 
Amendment does not require the state to provide a speech forum for speakers who 
have not requested an opportunity to speak. Id. 
138. Planned Parenthood v. Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d 564 (D.S.C. 2002). 
139. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 272-73 (1979). See also supra note 121. 
140. Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 227 (1987). See also 
supra note 122. 
141. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 386 (Jones, J., concurring). For example, if in Orr 
the state decided to impose the alimony requirement regardless of gender or, if in 
Ragland if the state decided to tax all publishers. 
142. Id. 
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"hold the only promise of escape from the burden that derives from 
the challenged statutes. "143 According to Judge Jones, the plaintiff 
could only be in "the same position as the appellant in Orr" if she 
challenged the total statutory scheme rather than this one stat­
ute.144 Thus, "[f]avorable redress could then result either in the 
state's allowing her to place the pro-choice sentiments on specialty 
license plates or in the state's shutting down the alleged First 
Amendment forum by banning, or ceasing to sponsor, all specialty 
plates."145 
Judge Jones also responds to the claim of an expanded notion 
of standing. She effectively declares that the claim that an ex­
panded notion of standing exists is simply wrong. In her view, a 
First Amendment facial challenge to a statute is not a challenge 
where "[the standing] requirements of injury-in-fact, causation, and 
redressability need not be met ... these requirements are not op­
tional."146 The relaxation principle is a "prudential standing princi­
ple"147 and really just a "species of third party standing Gus tertii), 
which we have recognized as a prudential doctrine."148 In her view, 
Keeler does not meet the redressability prong of standing, so the 
question of whether the doctrine of overbreadth applies is 
immaterial.149 
Additionally, she argues that in the Henderson I dissent Judge 
Davis incorrectly applied case law to support his contention that a 
relaxed standing principle should apply and override the traditional 
standing requirement. lso In her view, the plaintiffs' injuries in­
volved criminal convictions under laws that unconstitutionally vio­
lated free speech in all but one of the cases cited by the dissent.1Sl 
143. Id. (quoting Orr 440 U.S. 268 at 273). 
144. Id. See also Women's Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937, 947 (11th 
CiT. 2003) (holding "we will not instruct the State to close the entire specialty license 
plate forum because Appellants have not challenged the entire forum.") 
145. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 386 (Jones, J., concurring). 
146. Id. at 384. 
147. ld. at 385 n.4. 
148. ld. (Jones, J., concurring). 
149. ld. at 384-85 (Jones, J., concurring). 
150. ld. at 385 (Jones, J., concurring). 
151. ld. (Jones, J., concurring). See generally Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 
U.S. 147 (1969) (reversing conviction for violating Birmingham ordinance that made it 
an offense to participate in parade, precession, or public demonstration without a per­
mit); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (reversing conviction for failure to 
submit a film to Baltimore board of censors); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 
(1951) (reversing convictions for disorderly conduct for having bible discussion in a 
public park); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (reversing conviction for loiter­
ing under Alabama Act); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (reversing con­
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Jones distinguishes Lakewood, the one case that did not involve 
criminal sanction of a plaintiff, from Henderson I on the ground 
that the "statute obstructed the publisher's First Amendment 
rights" by requiring the plaintiff to pay taxes and incur an addi­
tional burden that other magazines did not incur.152 In her view, 
plaintiff Keeler does not complain of an injury analogous to the one 
in Lakewood because Louisiana's "choose-life" specialty plate stat­
ute does not require Keeler to take an affirmative action that bur­
dens her free speech.153 
In Bush the Eleventh Circuit denied the plaintiffs standing to 
sue on the ground that they failed to allege a cognizable injury.154 
In a lengthy discussion, the Eleventh Circuit illustrates what it be­
lieves was the tension in the plaintiff's articulation of the injury. 
Describing how it believed the Fifth Circuit had difficulty defining 
the precise injury in Henderson I, the Eleventh Circuit held that 
framing the injury as "the government's promotion of one side of 
the debate on the abortion rights issue in a speech forum, coupled 
with the lack of opportunity to present their opposing view" is an 
articulation that "presumes the state has done more than it actually 
has done."155 In their view, although the state has granted a speech 
forum to persons who desire a "choose-life" plate, it has not denied 
the forum to those with contrary views.156 The Eleventh Circuit 
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that they were denied access to the 
forum when the legislature rejected an amendment to the act that 
would have implemented a choose-choice specialty plate because 
there was "no clear evidence that the legislature intended to ex­
clude pro-choice groups from the specialty license plate forum by 
rejecting the amendment."157 The court viewed that evidence as 
indicating only that the legislature chose not to prefer the plaintiff's 
speech by allowing them to circumvent the requirements of the li­
censing scheme by getting an amendment rather than having to file 
pursuant to Florida law.I58 Thus, under the holding of Bush, until a 
plaintiff has applied for and been denied a plate, the plaintiff lacks 
standing because he or she has not suffered the requisite injury in 
viction under city ordinance for distributing religious pamphlet and magazine without a 
permit). 
152. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 385 n.5 (Jones, J., concurring). 
153. See id. at 385 (Jones, J., concurring). 
154. Women's Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937, 946-47 (11th Cir. 2003). 
155. Id. at 946. 
156. !d. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
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IV. How THE "CHOOSE-LIFE" SPECIALTY LICENSE PLATE 
CASES INCORRECTLY FRAMED THE ISSUE 
A. Critique of the No-Standing Position 
On the no-standing side of the debate, the underlying analysis 
argues that even if there is an injury, a favorable decision is not 
likely to redress the injury of which the individual pro-choice plain­
tiff complains.160 However, it is precisely because of the way they 
frame the issue that the advocates of the no-standing theory reach 
this outcome. In other words, if the only injury complained of is the 
inability to obtain a pro-choice plate, and all the "choose-life" spe­
cialty plate statutes do is grant access to a plate forum to another 
individual, then it is difficult to see how a favorable decision would 
redress the plaintiff's grievance.161 Conceptualizing an individual 
plaintiff's injury in this way makes declaring a choose-life specialty 
plate statute unconstitutional seem more like a penalty on the pro­
life speaker than a remedy for the plaintiff.162 In fact, it was fram­
ing the injury this way that led the Eleventh Circuit to declare that 
not only was the injury irredressable, but that there was no cogniza­
ble injury at all. A plaintiff simply cannot be injured if he or she 
has not even sought access to a forum to which someone else has 
been granted access.163 
However, the problem with this conceptualization of the injury 
is that it ignores the pro-choice plaintiffs' claim of viewpoint dis­
crimination on the part of the state legislature.164 Viewpoint dis­
159. Id. 
160. Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374, 384 (5th Cir. 2002) (Davis, J., dissent­
ing), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1048 (2002), vacated and superceded by No. 00-31171, 2003 
WL 151183 (5th Cir. 2003), on remand by 265 F. Supp. 2d 699 (E.D. La. 2003). 
161. See Nichol II, supra note 23, at 323-24 (providing an illustrative example to 
explain that what constitutes an injury is value-laden). 
162. See Henderson, 287 F.3d at 387 (Jones, J., concurring) (providing Judge 
Jones' discussion on how Judge Davis' acceptance of the plaintiff's injury would result 
in the removal of free speech for the pro-life view and do nothing for defendant). See 
also Bush, 323 F.3d at 946-47 (explaining how this does nothing to provide a speech 
forum for plaintiff). 
163. Bush, 323 F.3d at 946-47. 
164. Brief for Appellant-Plaintiffs at 2, Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374 (5th 
Cir. 2002) (No. 02-13981-J), available at 2002 WL 32174297. See also Nichol II, supra 
note 23, at 338-40 (arguing that "[t]he injury inquiry should embrace a significant pre­
sumption in favor of the plaintiff's claim of harm" and that doing this would provide 
consistency in a currently inconsistent standing inquiry). In Bush the Eleventh Circuit 
dealt with this issue by claiming that the plaintiffs assume too much when they claim the 
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crimination by the government is a free speech violation.165 Once 
the injury is framed as one where the legislature has participated in 
viewpoint discrimination, the door to a constitutional challenge 
should open because it is the injury of the viewpoint discrimination 
itself which is impermissible absent a compelling justification.166 
B. Critique of the Pro-Standing Position 
Unlike the no-standing side of the debate, the pro-standing 
side conceptualizes the plaintiff's injury as two-fold. The injury 
both denies the plaintiff a forum and the government promotes 
only one side of the abortion debate.167 In doing so, these pro­
standing advocates attempt to arrive at standing utilizing both a re­
laxed notion of standing and traditional standing analysis. How-
government denies them a speech benefit, because the government did not deny plain­
tiffs access to the forum by rejecting an application for a plate or discriminating in the 
application process. Bush, 323 F.3d at 946-47. However, this is simply a circular argu­
ment. The Eleventh Circuit has artfully argued that the answer to the claim that the 
plaintiffs have been denied a forum is to say they have not been denied access to a 
forum. Id. This argument makes a mockery of the requirement of Lujan that federal 
courts must look at standing questions in light of the stage of litigation in which defend­
ants find themselves. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,561 (1992) (stating 
that specific facts must be set forth to show standing at the summary judgment phase). 
In a motion for summary judgment, as in Bush, where the specific facts are ones that 
can be inferred to deny plaintiffs a forum, a genuine issue of material fact exists that 
must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. See Women's Emergency Network 
v. Dickinson, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (laying out the standard for 
summary judgment), affd, 323 F.3d 937 (11th Cir. 2003). 
165. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. School, 533 U.S. 98, 120 (2001) (find­
ing school's exclusion of a religious club from use of school building after school consti­
tuted unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination); Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. 
Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 600 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that it is a "fundamental 
rule of the First Amendment that viewpoint discrimination in the exercise of public 
authority over expressive activity is unconstitutional."); Sons of Confederate Veterans, 
Inc. v. Glendening, 954 F. Supp. 1099, 1102 (D. Md. 1997) (stating that it is not permissi­
ble for the government to target the particular views of a speaker on a particular subject 
in order to encourage one viewpoint and prohibit or discourage another viewpoint). 
166. See generally Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 
(1983). In this case a union and its members challenged the provision of a collective 
bargaining agreement that granted the bargaining representative exclusive access to 
teacher mailboxes and the interschool mail system to the exclusion of a rival union. Id. 
at 38-39. The claimed injury was that this access policy favored a particular viewpoint 
on labor relations in the Perry schools such that teachers would receive information 
from one union but be denied the perspective offered by the plaintiff union. Id. at 48­
49. The dissent stipulated that absent a compelling justification, viewpoint discrimina­
tion was not permissible. Id. at 65-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
167. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 387; Planned Parenthood v. Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d 
564, 570 (D.S.C. 2002) (citing Justice Davis affirmatively, "the plaintiffs are injured by 
the government's promotion of one side of the debate on the abortion rights issue in a 
speech forum, coupled with the lack of opportunity to present their opposing view."). 
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ever, their reasoning is flawed under present free speech 
jurisprudence. 
To begin with, the pro-standing argument's reliance on Lake­
wood for a facial challenge is misplaced.168 Lakewood is an appli­
cation of overbreadth in a prior restraint contexU69 In Lakewood, 
the Supreme Court granted standing because in that case the stat­
ute allowed the Mayor of Lakewood to grant or deny permits in 
order to access newspaper racks on an "unfettered," "discre­
tion[ary]" basis yo The "choose-life" specialty plate cases are dis­
tinguishable because the "choose-life" statutes do not work 
affirmatively to "chill" or "freeze" protected speech based on view­
point before the speech happensyl In Lakewood there was con­
cern that publishers would or did censor their publications in order 
to get a permit to access news racks.l72 As the Eleventh Circuit 
adeptly points out in Bush, the "choose-life" specialty plate statutes 
only explicitly apply to individuals desiring to purchase a "choose­
life" specialty piateY3 In other words, the statute only creates a 
forum for pro-life speech that did not exist prior to the statute's 
passage. The "choose-life" specialty plate statutes may effectively 
create a speech forum for one group and not another, but they do 
not potentially remove an individual plaintiff's access to a forum 
that he or she previously had access. In short, the statutes do not 
"chill" speech in the way we have come traditionally to expect in 
free speech casesy4 
Second, the attempt to find redress ability under traditional 
standing analysis fails because the particular conceptualization of 
the injury by the pro-standing side of the debate is not one found in 
any free speech cases to date.175 The injuries recognized in free 
168. See discussion supra Part 1I1.A. 
169. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988). 
170. [d. at 757. 
171. See discussion supra Part I.B. (discussing link between prior restraints and 
the doctrine of overbreadth). 
172. City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 757. 
173. Women's Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937, 947 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(distinguishing Bush from the authority plaintiffs cite). 
174. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514,533,554 (2001) (noting fear of 
public disclosure of a private conversation might have a "chilling effect" on free 
speech); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997) (stating that 
the vagueness of a content-based regulation often raises First Amendment concerns 
because it can "chill" a speaker's permissible speech); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visi­
tors of Univ., 515 U.S. 819,896 (1995) (funding restrictions might "chill" free speech). 
175. The closest articulation of an injury paralleling those of individual plaintiffs 
in the "choose-life" specialty cases is in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local 
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speech cases are either prior restraints on speech or injuries caused 
by a penalty that result from the allegedly unconstitutional stat­
uteY6 Redress happens in those types of First Amendment cases 
because it removes either the impermissible prior restraint on 
speech or the penalty imposed as a result of speech. In other 
words, the case law on which the pro-standing side of the debate 
relies would fit if the individual plaintiffs in the "choose-life" spe­
cialty plate cases complained that they were penalized under partic­
ular provisions of the statutes,177 or if their speech was prevented 
from ever happening.178 In other words, traditionally, when a stat ­
ute is declared unconstitutional the Free Speech right and the 
Equal Protection right that have been denied are restored to the 
plaintiffs.179 
V. "COMPETITIVE ADVOCATE STANDING": THE KEY TO THE 

COURTHOUSE GATE 

The difficulty of the pro-standing positions is that they are at­
tempts to find standing by utilizing cases that involve legislation di­
rected at the plaintiff as opposed to directed at a third party.180 The 
"choose-life" specialty plate statutes, however, are directed solely 
Educators' Association where the school district's collective bargaining agreement ex­
pressly excluded a rival union from accessing the email and voicemail systems of the 
school district's employees. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'Ass'n, 460 U.S. 
37 (1983). Standing was not an issue in that case. However, the "choose-life" specialty 
plate cases are different because the statutes do not affirmatively exclude the formation 
of "choose-choice" or similar plates. Compare id. with supra note 7 (the "choose-life" 
specialty plate cases). 
176. See discussion supra Part I.B. See also Doug Rendleman, Book Review, 
Irreparability Irreparably Damaged: The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 90 MICH. 
L. REv. 1642, 1664 (1992) (discussing that there is no important significance in a prior 
restraint's ability to prevent speech before it happens and a known criminal penalty's 
ability to chill expression before it happens because both make it clear that the speaker 
is not supposed to speak). 
177. For example, in Arkansas Writers' Project, the newspapers were penalized by 
being taxed and redress came in the form of possibly not being taxed. Ark. Writers' 
Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987). In Orr the remedy claimed was the possibility 
of not having to pay alimony. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979). 
178. For example, in Lakewood redress comes in the form of a publisher no 
longer having to censor protected speech to get a permit. Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 750. 
179. Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374, 387 (5th CiT. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 
1048 (2002), vacated and superceded by No. 00-31171, 2003 WL 151183 (5th CiT. 2003), 
on remand by 265 F. Supp. 2d 699 (E.D. La. 2003). 
180. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 27-15-3901-3908 (2003), and FLA. STAT.ch. 
320.08058 (2002), andMIss. CODE ANN. § 27-19-56.70 (2003), and OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, 
§ 1136 (2003) (providing only for the creation of a "choose-life" license plate tag), with 
Ark. Writers' Project, 481 U.S. at 221 (city ordinance required all but exempt publishers 
to pay a sales tax), and Orr, 440 U.S. at 270 n.1 (stating that ALA. CODE § 30 (1975) 
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to benefit a particular group. There is no direct monetary or crimi­
nal penalty, nor does the statute impose a heightened obligation 
directly on the plaintiffs.181 The pro-standing side of the issue sim­
ply ignores that the "choose-life" specialty plate legislation involves 
a novel question for free speech jurisprudence. The no-standing 
side of the debate appears to understand that this is a novel issue at 
some level;182 however, they incorrectly treat as settled the issue of 
whether a third party could suffer an injury based on legislation 
enacted to benefit another. They are also incorrect in their re­
sounding denial that redress for an injury suffered by a third party 
could come in the form of removing the legislatively granted benefit 
from the party being benefited. 
On closer examination, the pro-standing side of the debate ap­
pears to be grappling with an articulation of standing that is close to 
what the Second Circuit calls "competitive advocate standing"183 in 
Equal Protection cases. In those cases, the plaintiff is judged to 
have standing to bring an Equal Protection claim when the govern­
ment's allocation of a particular benefit "creates an uneven playing 
field"184 for organizations or individuals advocating views in a pub­
lic arena and the "plaintiff competes in that arena with a party to 
whom the government has bestowed a benefit."185 In other words, 
"competitive advocate standing" exists where the plaintiff alleges 
"discriminatory enforcement of a statute grants an unfair advantage 
to a political competitor which thereby diminishes the plaintiffs' 
ability to compete effectively in the political arena."186 
Similarly, plaintiffs in "choose-life" specialty plate cases should 
frame the injury in the following context: the legislature has allo­
provides that husband must provide alimony to ex-wife if she is not financially able to 
care for self). 
181. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.§§ 27-15-3901-3908; FLA. STAT. ch. 320.08058; 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-19-56.70. 
182. Although the no-standing position does not explicitly talk about the novelty 
of these cases, it adequately distinguishes existing case law. See discussion supra Part 
IILB. 
183. E.g., Ctr. for Reprod. Law and Policy v. Bush, 304 F.3d 183, 186 (2nd Cir. 
2002); Fulani v. Bentsen, 35 F.3d 49, 54 (2nd Cir. 1994); In Re Catholic Conference, 885 
F.2d 1020, 1024 (2nd Cir. 1989). 
184. Ctr. for Reprod. Law and Policy, 304 F.3d at 197. Compare id. with Hender­
son, 287 F.3d at 390 (Davis, J., dissenting) (discussing redress in the form of a "level 
playing field for all effected by the statute"). 
185. Ctr. for Reprod. Law and Policy, 304 F.3d at 197; In Re Catholic Conference, 
885 F.2d at 1029. 
186. Jordana G. Schwartz, Note, Standing to Challenge Tax-Exempt Status: The 
Second Circuit's Competitive Political Advocate Theory, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 723, 723 
(1990). 
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cated a free speech benefit to pro-life individuals in the form of a 
new forum for speech and, as a result, the law "creates an uneven 
playing field" whereby pro-life proponents are bestowed a competi­
tive advantage. Thus, the injury is that by enacting the statute the 
government denies the pro-choice plaintiff the level playing field 
for viewpoint that neutrality requires in a government-sponsored 
public forum. The pro-choice plaintiff would meet the requirement 
that he or she competes in the same arena in which the government 
bestowed a benefit to pro-life perspectives because her view is a 
view on the abortion debate. I87 
The virtues of framing the claim in this way are numerous. 
First, "competitive advocate standing" allows the plaintiff to articu­
late an injury that is not derived from the "chilling" nature of an 
overly broad statute or the potentially punitive vague statute. 
Rather, the injury under "competitive advocate standing" comes 
from precisely the kind of statutes we are dealing with here, nar­
rowly constructed statutesI88 that benefit one group of favored 
speakers with the intended effect of discriminating against another 
group of speakers.189 That is, the claimed injury is that the govern­
ment denies the pro-choice plaintiff access to a forum because of 
his or her political views. Thus, a lack of viewpoint neutrality is 
really the injury-in-fact under this analysis. Causation is met be­
cause the injury is "fairly traceable" to a state legislature's enact­
ment of a "choose-life" specialty plate tag. Redress is likely to 
follow from a favorable decision because declaring these types of 
statutes unconstitutional would "equalize the playing field of 
187. See Ctr. for Reprod. Law and Policy, 304 F.3d at 189. 
188. FLA. STAT. ch. 320.08058, § 30 (2002). "The department shall develop a 
Choose Life license plate as provided in this section. The word 'Florida' must appear at 
the bottom of the plate, and the words 'Choose Life' must appear at the top of the 
plate." Id. 
189. A similar theory to "competitive advocate standing" has emerged in the 
D.C. Circuit. This theory allows plaintiffs to establish standing where tax exemptions 
created a benefit for competitors. See, e.g., Normon Leon, The Second Circuit's Appli­
cation of Standing in In Re United States Catholic Conference, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 429, 
464 n.204 (1991). Additionally, [Arkansas Writers' Project,] Ark. Writers' Project v. 
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987), might be of help here because if we define the distin­
guishing quality of that case to be the "competitive" nature between those publishers 
granted an exemption and those denied an exemption, we have a similar situation to the 
tax cases out of the D.C. Circuit. See also Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374, 385 n.5 
(5th Cir. 2002) (Jones, J., concurring), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1048 (2002), vacated and 
superceded by No. 00-31171, 2003 WL 151183 (5th Cir. 2003), on remand by 265 F. 
Supp. 2d 699 (E.D. La. 2003) (Judge Jones argued that Lakewood would be on point if 
newspapers were rivals). 
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ideas. "190 Therefore, declaring the statutes unconstitutional would 
not be a speculative form of redress because there is no doubt it 
would stop the constitutional violation.191 
Additionally, framing the injury by utilizing the "competitive 
advocate standing model" makes it permissible to challenge the 
narrow "choose-life" specialty plate statute as opposed to the entire 
statutory scheme.192 This is because the injury, which is the demo­
tion of one side of the abortion debate because of the government's 
lack of viewpoint neutrality, is caused by the enactment of the 
"choose-life" specialty plate legislation. The injury is not the gov­
ernment's "unfettered discretion to grant or deny a specialty 
plate."193 More narrowly, under this model the injury is the gov­
ernment's alleged lack of viewpoint neutrality on the abortion issue. 
Attacking a statute authorizing a specialty plate for something 
other than an opinion on the abortion issue would not make sense 
190. Some might criticize that framing this debate in terms of "competitive advo­
cate standing" is problematic because it binds courts to use rational basis scrutiny be­
cause rational basis was applied to all the claims that said standing existed under the 
"competitive advocate standing" method. See, e.g., Ctr. for Reprod. Law and Policy, 
304 F.3d at 186; Faluni v. Bentsen, 35 F.3d 49, 54 (2nd Cir. 1994); In Re Catholic Con­
ference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1024 (2nd Cir. 1989). However, the difference between this case 
and other cases that have employed the "competitive advocate standing" framework is 
twofold. First, if treated as an Equal Protection claim, the claimed injury would be the 
denial of a speech forum based on certain "fundamentally protected" speech of a per­
son. It is likely that when discussing access to a forum for speech that strict scrutiny 
would apply. This topic concerns more than a tax break for favored speakers. See, e.g., 
Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983). Second, there is no 
reason why this articulation of standing could not directly apply to First Amendment 
claims. Free speech holds a special status, and therefore courts have loosened the 
standing requirement in various contexts. See discussion supra Part I.B. See also Police 
Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,96 (1972) (determining that "government may not grant 
the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those 
wishing to express less favored or more controversial views."). 
191. The redressability prong of standing provides two options when a statute is 
declared unconstitutional. First, the unconstitutional statute or law can be struck down. 
Alternatively, the statute can be reformed in order to make the unconstitutional law or 
statute constitutional. In the "choose-life" specialty plate cases, for example, the judges 
only spoke of redress in the form of striking down the unconstitutional provision. How­
ever, the plaintiffs' briefs in the Henderson line of cases clearly addressed this option as 
a form of redress. Brief for Appellant-Plaintiffs at 3-7, Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 
374, (5th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-13981-J), available at 2002 WL 32174297. 
192. This is the course the Fifth Circuit took when it vacated Henderson and de­
cided that it would entertain the case if plaintiff Keeler challenged the entire statutory 
scheme. Henderson v. Stalder, No. 00-31171, 2003 WL 151183 (5th Cir. Jan. 9, 2003). 
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that this would be the only way to chal­
lenge the statute in an attempt to get standing. Women's Emergency Network v. Bush, 
323 F.3d 937, 947 (11th Cir. 2003). 
193. Planned Parenthood v. Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d 564, 568-70 (D.S.C. 2002). 
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under this model because there is no link between those statutes 
and the speech forum the plaintiff claims that the government has 
granted to a political adversary. 
Furthermore, "competitive advocate standing" is consistent 
with the judiciary's role as a protector of the minority against the 
encroachment of the legislative majority.194 For example, it is no 
secret that many state legislatures have a pro-life majority of mem­
bers.195 By granting a forum to pro-life speakers via a "choose-life" 
specialty plate without providing a pro-choice plate, pro-life legisla­
tures provide a competitive speech advantage to the pro-life side of 
the debate that has immeasurable consequences on the ability of 
pro-choice groups to compete on equal footing in those states.196 
As Carolene Products 197 taught, one of the functions of the judici­
ary is to protect the civil rights of the minority from the 
majoritarian legislative process.198 It is troubling that when a court 
denies standing in cases where the claim is that the government has 
granted a speech benefit to one side of a political debate and not 
the other side of that debate, as in the "choose-life" specialty plate 
cases, the legislature may effectively be able to "prescribe what is 
orthodox in politics."199 This is because without standing no re­
194. See United States v. Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1944) (stating 
that for the scope of the decision there was no need to determine if "prejudice against 
'discrete and insular minorities' prohibits the protection of minorities to the point 
where there should be a 'more searching judicial inquiry.' "). 
195. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 388 n.1 (announcing that Louisiana has declared it­
self a pro-life state). See also Nat'l Abortion Rts. League, Positions of Governors and 
State Legislatures on Choice, at www.naral.orgipublications!loader.cfm?url=ICommon­
spoUsecurity/getfile.cfm&PageID=2193 (last visited Mar. 1, 2004). The methodology is 
not scientific, but it is clear that many states have legislatures in which the majority 
leans heavily pro-life or pro-choice. Id. 
196. See, e.g., Int'I Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Fed. Election 
Comm'n, 678 F.2d 1092, 1098 (1982) (noting union members' allegations of the "rela­
tive diminution of their political voices-their influence in federal elections-as a direct 
result of the discriminatory imbalance Congress is alleged to have ordered"). Similarly, 
providing pro-life speakers an extra forum would reduce the voices of the pro-choice 
side in public debate, therefore reducing their voice in elections, etc. See also Berry, 
supra note 9 (discussing Henderson and the underlying merits of the substantive claim 
of viewpoint discrimination). 
197. Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
198. Id. 
199. W. V. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (noting that 
government should not determine citizens' opinions in "politics, nationalism, religion, 
or other matters of opinion," nor "force [them] to confess by word or act their faith 
therein."). It is important to reiterate here that standing is a threshold question. The 
claim is that the state has not had a neutral viewpoint as is required when it opens up a 
forum for political speech. A claim based on competitive advocate standing does not 
foreclose the option of the state to argue that there is no limited public forum opened at 
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course is available to the political minority via the judicial process 
to repair the injury suffered by the plaintiff. 
The above point is especially important because opponents of 
this conceptualization of the injury might claim that it is an attempt 
to find standing in an area in which the legislature, as opposed to 
the judiciary, should have the final say.200 Lujan made clear that 
the separation of powers principle is inherent in the constitutional 
requirement of standing.201 However, when a court correctly 
frames the injury-in-fact utilizing the "competitive advocate stand­
ing" model it becomes clear that the "choose-life" specialty plate 
cases involve claims that are not in violation of the separation of 
powers principle, but rather are about the federal courts' legitimate 
power to determine whether a legislature has stepped outside of the 
bounds of its power to legislate certain matters.202 What this option 
provides is a loosening of the prudential concerns against genera­
lized grievances203 and an accurate application of the redressability 
prong of standing. In these cases, and in future cases posing similar 
problems, the government should not be allowed to invoke the lack 
of standing as a shield just because it stabbed someone in the back 
instead of the heart. 
CONCLUSION 
The "choose-life" specialty plate legislation being enacted 
throughout the country runs the risk of drowning out the voices of 
pro-choice advocates because it grants pro-life advocates a mega­
phone. If courts do not accurately account for the type of injury 
alleged in cases involving legislation similar to the "choose-life" 
specialty plate legislation, and if courts continue to deny standing, it 
all and that this is the speech of the state itself. However, standing is not a mechanism 
for deciding the merits of a claim. The aim is to make sure there is an "actual case or 
controversy," and that is all. Valley Forge Christian ColI. v. Am. United for Separation 
of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,99 
(1968» (determining that "[t]he requirement of standing 'focuses on the party seeking 
to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have 
adjudicated.' "). 
200. See, e.g., Flast, 392 U.S. at 106 (noting courts lack "confidence in [hearing] 
cases ... where a taxpayer seeks to employ a federal court ... to air his generalized 
grievances about the conduct of government or the allocation of power in the Federal 
System"). 
201. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
202. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (establishing judicial review as the 
mechanism for determining when the legislature has stepped outside of its designated 
role and acted unconstitutionally). 
203. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
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will become possible for legislatures to drown out the voices of any 
politically undesirable minority simply by granting benefits to those 
individuals whose speech they like. Courts have recognized a form 
of standing that allows plaintiffs to challenge statutes they believe 
attempt to manipulate public debate by granting benefits to their 
adversaries. It is time for the federal judiciary to adopt this stand­
ing principle universally in order to keep those legislatures hostile 
to the free speech rights of some individuals in the role of policy 
makers and out of the role of civil rights breakers. 
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